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I. Introduction: 
In the little more than a quarter of a century since the 
end of World War II, extensive changes have significantly 
altered Africa's role in the world political economic system. 
Over forty new nations have attained political independence 
and embarked on differing paths of nation-building on the con-
tinent. A number characterize their approaches as 'socialist,' 
but only a handful have begun to make the necessary institu-
tional changes to initiate an effective transition towards 
socialist reconstruction of their political economies. 
The world economic system within which the new African 
states are striving for development has also changed. On the 
one hand, a third of the world's population -- in widely 
.. 
differing countries ranging from the Soviet Union and China to 
Vietnam and Cuba -- have proclaimed as their goal the building 
of socialism. There is no monolithic model for the Africans 
or any other state to follow. Each nation is working out its 
own approach. Serious disagreements have emerged as to the 
essential next steps and appropriate institutional changes. 
Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of the socialist perspec-
tive, especially in developing nations, has provided ideolo-
gical and evei:i material support for African countries seeking 
to break out of the capitalist commercial system and recon-
struct their political economies along a socialist path. 
On the other hand, the capitalist commercial systeo/-, 
itself, has changed. The old model, in which colonial governments 
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and companies divided up the Third World, including Africa, 
into separate spheres of governmental control and economic 
exploitation, has all but disappeared. In its place giant 
tra:Ill1snational corporations have emerged, sometimes collaborating, 
sometimes bitterly competing, to maintain and extend their 
penetration in the newly-independent nations. 
This chapter will first examine the nature of the changing 
capitalist world system into which the new states of Africa 
were born and then outline the efforts of some African states 
reduce their dependence on that system and initiate a trans-
i ti on to socialism in order. to provide productive emplopmemt opportuni tjes 
inat raise the living standards of the masses of people i ri al 1- c:;ectors. 
II. New African States v. the Changing Capitalist World System: 
Several factors shape the new methods by which trans-
national corporations seek to achieve their old goals in the 
post World War II world. 1 These impact on the development 
perspectives of particular African countries in differing ways. 
First, technological changes have led to a basic shift in· 
the capital ist international division of labor. 2 The demand 
for some raw materials -- cotton, sisal, even basic minerals 
like copper -- has been relatively reduced by the introduction 
of synthetics, substitutes and the recycling of used materials 
in the core industrialized economies. African countries, whose 
export enclaves had been geared by decades of colonialism 
primarily to the export of one or two of these commodities, 
have been deeply adversely affected.3 In contrast, countries 
producing raw materials for which technological developments 
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have created new and expanding demand -- oil, uranium, bauxite 
-- have, at least temporarily, 'lucked out.' They can take 
advantage of the competition 
between transnational corporations, especially those with the 
needed research, technical capacity and finances, to realize 
the new technological possibilities. 4 
Second, the transnational corporations have entered a 
fierce competition to sell their excess manufactured goods in 
African markets.5 Some had previously been excluded b,/ the 
French-British colonial hegemony. Now they each seek to secure 
a foothold by building last-stage assembly and processing 
plants behind tariff barriers erected by the African Governments. 
This procedure involves the initial import of capital-intensive 
machinery and equipment and the continuing import of parts and 
materials. It only marginally alters the pattern of external 
dependence of the typical African economy. Only under the 
umbrella of the racist re gime of South Africa have the transnationals 
contributed to building up an integrated industrial base which 
has led statisticians to list that country as the only one in 
Africa among the 'developed' nations of the world. 6 
Third, the heavy capital investments required to utilize 
large scale capital intensive technologies to extract the 
mineral resources of the periphery has fostered the emergence 
of globally-competing transnational financial institutions 
to facilitate the expansion of their nationally-based trans-
national industrial corporate associates. 7 The efforts of 
national center government ;-; to (~mpl c·y I(tJynsian-type monetary 
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controls has led to the mushrooming of the essentially unreg-
ulated Eurodollar market where the largest banks sometimes 
Co Ntp ~ 
collaborate, sometimes _ ·, to capture the lucrative 
corporate business. 
Confronting these transnational corporate giants, many 
African governments have adopted state interventionist policies 
which they have proclaimed as variants of 'African socialism.' 
In reality, they are typically little more than thinly disguised 
state capitalist measures which have led to increased dependence 
on transnational corporate and financial institutions. They 
have made few changes in the inherited sets of institutions 
which gear their political economies to the export of raw mate~ 
rials. On the contrary, they have pursued measures to expand 
the export of agricultural and mineral produce in keeping with 
conventional wisdom, hoping to earn foreign exchange to finance 
their rapidly multiplying administrative and infrastructural 
costs. 8 Their competitive efforts to sell their crude products 
to the core industrial nations, where relative demand was in 
many cases actually declining, contributed significantly to 
falling prices and worsened terms of trade~ African farmers, 
who owned their own farms (as in the case of cocoa in Ghana 
and Western Nigeria, coi'fee in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and 
Ivory Coast, cotton in Sudan, Egypt, Uganda and Tanzania) were 
directly affected b y the fall of world prices for their 
exports.9 Government acquisition of shares of ownerslip of 
export industries -- for example, the purchase of 51 percent 
and 100 percent, respectively, of the copper mines in Zambia 
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and Zaire -- did little to alter the outcome. 10 The Govern-
ments were forced to shoulder the burden of direct profit 
losses, in addition to the loss of tax revenues. 
Government measures to stimulate import-substitution 
manufacturing industries, including Government ownership of 
shares through state corporations, served primarily to encourage 
transnational corporations to establish last-stage assembly 
and processing plants. They typically produced the wrong kinds 
of commodities -- mainly luxury and semi-luxury items for those 
who could afford to buy them; (beer and cigarettes became an 
increasingly important segment of local manufacturintj industry). 
They tended to be relatively capital-intensive, based on the 
import of transnational corporate technologies, instead of 
focusing on providing jobs for fSI'OWi ne; numb(~rs o:f urba:rn 
unemployed. They continued to import parts and materials, rather 
than contribute to development of domestic resources. They 
were located in and fostered the further growth of the export 
enclaves, instead of spreading productive employment opportu-
nities in neglected rural areas .ll 
Despite innumerable government proclamations of the nec-
essity of ' rural development,' extensive areas outside the export 
enclave continued to stagnate. Inherited marketing structures, 
credit and farm inputs are too frequently directed to existing 
export-oriented agriculture, 12 often dominated by large 
estates or 'progressive' African farmers. Class stratification 
· has steadily deepened in expanding cash crop regions. Food 
production, mostly carried on by women given little option but 
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to continue to use out-moded techniques on less fertile lands 
has tended to decline. -l'he drought of the 1970s, with its 
associated widespread famine, exposed the inadequacy of food 
production , as nation after nation 
was forced to spend precious foreign exchange to buy grain on 
the world market. 1 3 The migration of tens of thousands of 
rural poor into overcrowded urban slums has been accelerated 
across the continent. 
In most African countries, state intervention, far from 
initiating a transition to a socialist political economy, 
fostered the burgeoning of what has become widely known as the 
'b t. b . . •14 ureaucra ic ourgeoisie. Parastatal managers, together 
with key government administrators and politicians, used their 
legally-obtained high salaries, not infrequently along with 
no-so-legally obtained additions75 and funds borrowed from the 
banks, to invest in buying up large farms, speculative real 
estate, trade and, in some cases, shares in local subsidiaries 
of transnational corporations. They utilize their influence 
at national and local levels to direct a variety of state 
actions to foster their private sector entrepreneurial activities. 
Widespread official criticism of the growing 'urban-rural 
gap' typically focuses on holding down the wages of low paid 
urban workers. It is seldom seriously intended to lead to effective 
redistributive. income policies or to capture and direct 
investcble surplus es to the planned restructuring of the 
productive sectors to spread employment opportunities throughout 
the countryside. Rather, it is commonly designed to ensure the 
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continued profitability of factorio~ ; , mines and estates in 
which the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' now holds a personal 
stake. 
Pursuing a variety of essentially state capitalist policies, 
most of the newly-independent African countries, by the 1970s, 
had become, in shortt increasingly externally dependent, their 
fragile economies increasingly characterized by instability 
and a growing gap between the 'haves' and 'have nots. 116 In 
many, the attempt to maintain a democratic fac ade gave way to 
military rule in a pattern all too reminiscent of Latin America. 
Although throughout the sixties all the newly independent 
African countries competed eagerly to attract overseas capital, 
transnational corporations and financial institutions expanded 
their investments most rapidly in the racist state capitalist 
economy of South Africa. Some $20 billion in foreign funds 
were poured into that country, exceeding the total new foreign 
-- -
investment (excluding that in pumping oil). in the rest of the 
African corit-inent combined. 17 - Foreign funds · 
·today provide a fourth of South Africa's total investment, 
about 40 percent of the capital in its manufacturing industry. 
West German and United States-based ·t;ransnational corpora-
tions in particular expanded their capital and technological 
contributions in South African manufacturing industry. In 
this they frequently collaborated closely with South African 
parastatals, sometimes supplementing British cqital, sometimes 
squeezing it out. Four out of five U. s. dollars invested in 
manufacturing in the entire African continent, for example, 
are concentrated in South Africa. 18 
-g-
, "'fransnational corporations and, in some cases, 
their homegovernments apparently viewed South Africa's police 
state as a 'stable' regional sub-core from which to conduct 
story, recently reasserted that Sotth Africa "has a legally 
constituted Goverrunent and is a stabilizing influence in the 
southern part of that continent. 1119 
Transnational corporations' affiliates and subsidiaries 
have expanded their profitable oper~tions throughout the southern 
African periphery from their bases in South Africa. They 
participate in various kinds of ventures with South African 
capital to obtain minerals and agricultural raw materials: 
iron ore, pineapples and timber from Swaziland; copper, nickel 
and diamonds from Botswana; copper, zinc, uranium and £ish 
• ~ f _!.L (). D}h C- ~I ~\J' . C\ l.S ~ 2..c. \·~ ~ _4v-.JJ %.t>. )\\ (O. 
from Nambia; chrome and coal from ZimbabweJ r They have also 
established distribution networks through which they sell the 
goods they produce or import into South Africa throughout the 
southern third of the continent. 
In the 1970s, Africa, along with the rest of the Western 
world, was deeply 
economic crises. 
affected by international mo netary and 
J .ee~'4\,,;..'l "-II'\~ p •Tlta4hi-i' o( ~c"s i.1· p ~S1"1\ t.~d 
Th:$/\i?Q 'uuQJi!~Qa@e e l: tiaQ 80~P~ @•~ f 
(.~CA 'f"C.t:.+e-n·c; h't. o( 
the capitalist world was, in fact, rooted in part in the rapid 
post-World War II extension of transnational corporate pene-
tration in the newly-independent countries of Africa, a s well 
as the rest of the Third World. Their accumulation and 
reinvestment of vast amounts of capital in expanding ·t;echno-
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logically-advanced production in the core industrial countries 
--- ·~- - · -~- · . 
was accompanied by increasingly 
competitive efforts to extract greater investible surplus es 
from the periphery. They continued to mine greater amounts 
of crude materials produced by low paid labor. They expanded 
their sales of high price capital-intensive technologies as 
well as luxury and semi-luxury items for the limited high 
income groups. They continued to drain the lop-sided Third 
. ~ ··~ t-eve r 
World economies of profits, interest/ dividends, a > igh 
sal .aries for their managerial personnel. These activities 
L---
further narrowed the potential markets for their growing sur-
plus of manufactured goods. 
Throughout the 'fifties and increasingly in the'sixties, 
in a pattern reminiscent of the 1920s, worsening terms of 
trade caused country after country in Africa, as well as else-
where in the Third World, to seek to reduce their imports and 
2. further expand their exports. 20 ~kP8'1!t~fte~t the 1960s, rising 
domestic expenditures for infrastructure worsened terms of 
trade, and mounting balance of payments deficits caused many 
African states to expand their internal and external debt. In 
the late sixties and seventies, spurred by International Monetary 
d tv~l lf t.l""t ll e ,;.. ev ~-A.c,i 't\J 
Fund advice and prodding by transnational ba s, many 
a> introduced' austerity programs' and currency devaluations. 
Taxes, especially those on middle andJower income gn!llps, were 
raisec4 ••• ~overnment spendine; was slashed. Monetary and 
fiscal measures tended to squ eeze credit and cause unemployment, 
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esp ecially among smaller firms . Devaluation led to higher 
prices for the imported i terns on whic.h their economies had 
become increasingly dependent, contributing to further domestic 
price increases. All these measures tended to shift the burcvm 
of the crisis in the African countries onto the shoulders of 
the lower income groups. 
By the late 1960s the Western nations, too, began to suffer 
balance of payments difficulties. These culminated in the 
United States' devaluation of the dollar and the emergence of 
the international monetary crisis. Within a few short years, 
the euphemistically-titled "recession" had spread throughout 
advanced Western economies of the United States, Western Europe, 
and Japan. 
the 
of the profound technological changes which had altered the 
relative importance of particular resources and the countries 
in which they were located. The manipulation of oil prices by 
OPEC countries, together with the transnational oil countries, 
raised the profits of both • . This contributed to still worse 
terms of trade for those Third World countries which had to 
import high-priced petroleum ~roducts as well as the manufac-
tured good;.-·produced in the core industrial countries. 
As the African countries exhausted their traditional 
sources of credit, they beµ;an to turn to thA F.11T'nr'l ,..,, , ,_,,.,.. ,..,,,., ...... ir~+-
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for funds. 21 The largest borrowers were not the "low income" 
African countrns, 6-1, ;=. +but the "middle" and "high income" 
countries with vi·sible resources which the international 
bankers assumed could be exploited to ensure repayment. z E -
Zaire, wi_ th its large copper and cobalt reserves, borrowed 
about $431 million between 1971 and 1974. 23 As copper prices 
plummeted and import costs rose, Zaire's mismanaged economy was 
faced with bankruptcy by 1977. I ts inability to repay its 
transnational banking creditors was a major factor accelerating 
the latter's efforts to utilize the International Monetary Fund 
facilities to 'discipline' defaulting countries to ensure they 
24'°11 
would pay their debts. 
fi D~v~'Wh1le the attention of western financial circles focused 
on Zaire, South Africa, confronting mounting unemployment and 
unrest among its Afr ican population, rising import costs andd 
growing military expenditures, borrowed far more heavily. 25 
It devalued twice, aggravating internal inflationary pressures 
which led to cumulative price increases of over 30 percent in 
1975-6. By March of 1977, it was reported to have borrowed 
ovl-
.j;il eest $9 billion, about a third of it mobilized by U. s . banks, 
especially Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, Manufacturers' Hanover, I 
and Morgan Guarant~~·~2_6 _____________________ ~--~-------------------
In shor t, the transnational corporations' competitive 
penetration of AfDica, spurred by rapid technological advance, 
contributed to aggravating the underlying contradictions which 
J ~ P~ l'l ·l · \I\ ~ ~ '<'J. pM)I "'-~~ 0 t\ t( tke ~U\\~IC.. • . . 
led to theft'il9•Q 2 rgQiiQQ 8 5 -i"iie @'! 8 H e-2 al crises i f Oi'!ljT b&! I Bih ::t::t1: 
in the 1970s. In many of the politically-indenendent Afri~Rn 
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their own politic al and economic status / ~:rwngh the i li9F@S:s-Qid 
upie ef-e ba~e powe1. They made little or no effort to restructure 
the inherited institutions which linked t heir peripheral export-
oriented economies to the Western commercial world s ystem. 
Instead, they competed with e ach other to create 'attractive 
investment climates' to invite further transnational corporate 
penetration ... d 1 1 g · • The expansion of their low-cost crude 
exports coupled with worsening terms of trade and the direct 
drain of profits, interest, dividends, and high salaries to 
transnational corporations did, however, narrow their markets 
for the mounting manufactured goods surpluses produced by the 
accelerated investments in the industrial core nations. The 
Gt5 qr; " '4 ~ . 
emergence of the international monetary 'crisis' asees•~8•ei by 
1~1 -u.~ ' de 
the oil 'crisis'> in rea1L ty, a feature of the ::t=litllll:milal:I_.. ... 
of the general crisis throughout the capitalist world. 
III. Initiating the Transitimto SQcialism: 
Lbo~ ~ - .J ) 
In only a few countrie~ aid the governing political parties 
seek to implement the essential institutional changes required 
to reduce external dependence and initiate a meaningful trans-
ition to socialism. not most, African governments 
have proclaimed their aim as 'socialist.' A meaningful transition 
\ m p •~· f e •\ -ho -,... o { 
to socialism µ J - nTT?DIJ requires/\measures to create the necessary 
institutions to achie ve socialized ownership of the means of 
production, and their development to meet the needs of the 
masses of the working people in urban and rural areas. Inevitably, 
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given their disparate historie.s and inherited institutional 
structures, their leadership, and the nature of the particular 
obstacles confronting them, each African country must follow 
this path in its own way. In a brief overview of this type, it 
is only possible to illustrate the range of widely differing 
efforts with a few examples. 
Examination of the experience of African countries embarking 
on the transition to socialism suggests that the early phases of 
that process require two essential kinds of institutional change. 
First, it is necessary to create a political base, uniting urban 
wage earners, peasants and committed 'petty bourgeois' elements27 
behind the necessary institutional changes needed to build a 
socialist economy. Creation of this kind of base is vital. In 
Africa, it has been rendered difficult by the small size of the urban 
working class and its lack of consciousnessf 8 difficulties of 
communicatii1g with scattered rural peasants, and the institut-
ionalized isolation of the intellectuals. 
In Algeria and the former Portuguese territories, years of 
guerrilla struggle helped to forge a degree of unity among the 
national liberation forces. 
Boumedien the president of Algeria, and the civil 
are suggest-ive o:f thenany continuing difficulties encountered by 
efforts to cement the essential mass base for buildin~ socialism. 
The second kind of institutional chan8e necessary in the 
transition stage involves utilizing state machinery to control 
the 'commanding heights': basic industries, export-import and 
internal wholesale trade, the banks and financial institutions. 
Experience suggests this is critical for the implementation of 
a long-term strategy to restructure the lop-sided, externally 
dependent political economy to achieve an integrated, balanced 
structure capable of providing productive employment and higher 
levels of living for the masses of the population. 29 The process 
of transition necessitates the formation and implementation of 
a series of plans in the context of, say, a twenty-year per-
spective program to restructure the political economy. ~ational 
plans should ensure implement ation of measures to: (1) strengthen 
national control over the 'commanding heights' and reduce transnational 
corporate and financial influence over the critical sectors of 
the economy; (2) allocate physical resources to build appropi~iate 
kinds of industries, .specifically linked to increased agricultural 
productivity, to provide productive employment opportunities and 
produce 1'hg hih§ B U t goods to meet the needs of the people in 
all sectors of the economy; (3) implement financial plans to 
achieve a more equitable pattern of income distribution and 
direct all investable surpluses produced in the economy to the 
critical productive sectors; (4) formulate educational and 
training pn:>grams to ensure that in form and content they con-
tribute to the necessary supply of qualified men and women to 
staff industrial and agricultural projects as they are developed. 
The African countries embar king on the transition to socialism 
have not all been equally successful in achieving these two 
critical kinds of institutional change. In the brief space here 
available, it is only possible to review the contrasting ex-
perience of a few: Tanzania, Algeria, and the former Port uLu eBe 
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colonies. 
A. Tanzania: 
T~nzania is the only former British colony whose government 
is still explicitly dedicated, after almost fifteen years of 
political independence, to the attainment of socialism, in the 
sense of the term employed in this chapter. At independence, 
President Nyerere himself devoted a year to organizing TANU, 
the National political party, to build mass base. Over the 
years, a large proportion of the population has been brought 
together into ten-house cells, purportedly designed as the vehicle 
for two-way communication between the people and the leadership. 
The extent to which its members are imbued with a clear socialist 
perspective is less clear.3° President Nyerere himself is an 
avowed pragmatist. Some claim that the leadership of the party 
are not really devoted to the cause of building socialism. They 
argue that 'petty bourgeois' elements seek to advance their own 
interests, a fully 
socialized 
the Zanzibar party are, as yet, unknown. 
In 1967, following the fall in world prices for Tanzania's 
major export crops, TANU initiated measures through the govern-
ment to assert direct control over the 'commandi-qg heights. ,32 
The foreign-owned banks and insurance firms were taken over 
in toto, and over the years, integrated into a single, functioning 
financial system increasingly capable of directing credit to 
the key productive sectors. The major import and interal 
( , I ) 
I ,/ 
wholesale houses were placed 1n the stnte sector. Not without 
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severe difficulties and several reorganizations, these have 
begun to regulate the flow of imports and distrib~tion throughout 
the nation, more or less within the framework of planned perspec-
tives. The Government acquired a majority of the shares of 
ownership of the largest existing industries and placed them 
within a parastatal sector. Most of the top-level managers re-
mained those provided by the transnational corporate 'partners' 
within the framework of controls operated through the state-
owned financial and trade sectors as well as state participation 
on local boards of directors.33 
~ ~erious problems have been encountered 
in reshaping old institutions and . 9r:eating new ones to ensure that 
these efforts to assert state control these critical sectors of 
the economy have in re al ity been conducted to enhance the welfare 
of the masses of the population. ~' These . ma.y be illustrated by 
examining two aspects of the parastatals' (state corporations') role in the in-
dustrial sectora 
First, as is true ~f all former British colonies, Tanzania's ma.instrument 
of control over its newly acquired shares in industry was the para.statal. Legally, 
however, the parastatal was initially conceived as an autonomous body, outside the 
controls of the civil service. Thiswa.s assumed to enable it to operate flexibly 
like a profit-maximizing private enterprise. In Tanzania, too, the daily opera-
tions of the pa.rastatlls were left in the hands of the managers supplied by the 
foreign partners who still owned an important block of shares. Ministerial control 
could be exercised only indirectly through board meetings. The ministers were typically 
so over-burdened with responsibilities that they were unable to do more than provide 
cursory supervision. As a result, it was diffic~l.t to ensure that the factories 
-19-
contributed most effectively to Tanzanian development. What they produced 
and how they produced it tended to be determined by transnational corporate 
aims, rather than Tanzanian IDIX1111XKX development perspectives in not a few 
cases. Many of the plants were dependent on imported parts and materials. 
Control of decisions as to what to import and how much to pay for these some-
times gave managers the means of shipping out investable surpluses through 
34 
overinvoioing. There was always the danger, too, that Africans who entered 
the managerial ranks dominated by the foreign partners might be co-opted into 
the transnational corporate sphere, seeking to take advantage of high salaries 
and perks to advantage themselves. 
Tanzania did attempt to devise protections against these iangers. First, 
Tanzania's governmental authorities had the power, th1mt1gh the nationalized 
banking system, to require the parastatals to bank with the government bank. This 
potentially provided them with additional information about financial conditions, 
enabling them to require firms to carry out their financing activities in accord 
with national plans. 
Second, the Chairman of the National UeveloJment Corporation, the umbrella 
parastatal responsible for all firms in which the government holds shares, was made 
chattman of each company in the group, and National Development Corporation department 
heads,~Wl!a:M~ responsible for particular companies,zxi sat on their boards of directors. 
A management information system was created to monitor the performance of the Cor-
poration's departments. The managerment executive committee regularly reviewed opera.-
ting problems and current progress.35 
In an effort to replace transnational corporate managers, Tanzania channelled 
university graduates into state corporations until localization there equalled that 
in the Civil Service.36 At the same time, the Presidential Standing Committee on 
Parastatal Organizations,instituted following the Arusha Declaration, froze parastatal 
salar1es37 and curtailed other perquisites such as housing and aar allowances.38 
Nationalization of rental housing reduced the opportunity for parastatal managers 
to speculate in real estate, a common form of enrichment in other countries. 
zn line with its declared socialist perspectives, Tanzaaia also instituted 
a program of workers' councils in an eff ort t o develop workers control of para-
statals from below. 39 These aimed to both increase managerial responsibility 
for national development , and to increase worker productivity. In reality, however, 
40 they remained primarily advisory bodies. As might be expected, they •ere primarily 
concerned with working conditions and pay of the workers, themselves. It is difficult 
for workers, without a great deal of knowledge of possibly conflicting national 
and transnational corporate goals and methods of operation, particularly specific 
book keeping skills, to participate effectively in directing ma.n~~•rial practices 
along nationally desirable paths. Institutionalization of effective workers' control 
inevitably takes time and requires worker education and ideological leadership re-
lating the particular fa.ctory and the need for national reconstruction of the economy. 
A second aspect of the problems encountered by Tanznaia. in its efforts to 
assert national control over development through goveI'D.llent onership ~f shares in 
industrial projects is that of how to ensure that new investments contribute to 
building a more bllanced industrial and agricultural economy capable of providing 
increasingly productive employment opportunities for the broad masses of the population 
in all s~etors. On the one hand, the institutional mechanisms for •nsuring that new 
investments are appropriate take time to establish. The National Development 
Corporation, 1nit1ally supposetl to 1Jehave like a private fi rm had to be reogganized 
to give it greater control over its newly acquired subsidiaries. At the same time, 
it had to work closely together with the government planning agencies and the! ba.nks, 
as well as the political party, to direct new investments to the production of 
essential consumer goods and eventually machinery and equipment at the appropriate 
levels of technology. But the criteria for new investments remained vague. "Short 
term opportunity and accident" tended to dictate choice between projecta.41 The 
Second Five Year plan, while attempting to list several social criteria, left the 
task of formulating a longer term iiduetrial strategy for the future. Taazan1an 
the 
ministers on/boards of direotora had little direct influence on the National Develop-
-20-
ment Corporation investment policy& Theaeelves busy men, they received papers for 
directors' meetings only shortly before they took place. The Board decided 
major indistrial investments like the Mwanza. Textile Mill, the Sisal Pulp Mill, 
&nd the fertilizer factory after only a weekss adv&nce notice.42 
The foreign investo:l:'s initiated 11ost of these projects, hoping to obtain 51 
percent or more of goverament financing. They made their profits in the initial 
sale of machinery and equipment and, in some inst&nces, &n on-going supply of 
pa.rts and materials. French interests, f0r example, promoted the Mwanza Textile 
Mill. The staff lacked sufficient time to consider issues beyond theproposa.l's 
economic viability in the conventional sense. The foreign investors' proposals 
hinged prima.rily on their prospective profits. The Mwanza textile mill was rela-
tively capital-intensive and re,uired the import of expensive machinery, parts and 
materials. In contrast to the Friendship Textile Mill, built near Dar es Sala&m 
with Chinese assistance, the Mwanz& factory cost about -three times a s much .s.nd 
~mpl oyed about a thl:i:.··i a.s many workers f or the sa.me output . Given Tanzania• s 
scarce capital and need fer employment opportunities, the Mwanza plant appears to 
have been built without regard. to the criteria formulat ed i n the Plan. 
The social criteria delineated 1n the Plan43, furthermore, could be construed 
to conflict with overall profitabl l ity, also an explicitl y formulated goal. 44 In 
1972, the General Mang9mT of the National Development Corporation reported, "(I)n 
several eases in the pa.st we have been bla.med f or mi:ainterpreting Govern11ent and 
Party po11e1es.•4f 
Unless the GovenuRent and Party could deeidei on the appropriate long term 
strategy for the phpsical development of industry, linked closely with careful 
financial planning, the full potential for restructuring the economy appeared unlikely 
to be realized. It was a11pected that such a long tenn strategy would be incorporated 
in the next five yea.x plan, but whether it wou.1d be, and to what extent 1 t would be 
successfulj:y implemented to restructure the Tanzanian economy, remains to be seen. 
To date, the primary emphasis in Tanzania has been on the creation of uea11B.a villages, 
,(• :. 
-21-
proclaimed as an eff ort to create agricultural production units to 
avoid increasing rural stratification as cash crop production expands.~ •· 
- ~l~ ~!'!'t>J!t . 1fll~ ac~le.rated ia the 1971s~~ not w~thout difficulti e • 
The reall ocation and development of agricultural resources ia a ti .. -consulling procesE 
It takes a year simply to plow, sow and harvest ·even· a single 
perennial crop. At the same time, peasants must continue to 
produce foodstuffs if they are to remain sel~-suf ficient at 
least during the transition to greater (planned) participation 
in the expanding national division of labor. Unfortunately, in 
the Tanzania case, the accelerated villa[';ization program 
coincided with the drought of the early 'seventies which reduced 
crop output in widespread areas of the countryside as well as 
throughout the rest of the continent. As a result, Tanzania's 
food output declined and it was forced to import enormous 
amounts of grain. This, together with the rising costs of oil 
and manufactured goods imports, contributed to serious balance 
of payments deficits. To cover these, Tanzania, like many 
*7 other African countries, was forced to borrow funds abroad. . 
This heavy borrowing may seriou_sly en<l<.mge r 'I'm zania 's 
efforts to implement its transition to socialism if the Govern-
ment is forced by its creditors to adopt typical IMF-type 
remedies.• The Internatienal Menetary Fund'"' -r.1.~ '!i.n -p:resmitln~ governments t• 
implement policies which throw the burdan of economic crisis en the werking peoples 
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of the Third World ceunt1~es has been well decumented. In Africa, the first post-
independence African governments te experience this kind of pressure was Ghana under 
President Nkrumah. As eecea prices plummeted in the early 1960s, Ghana cenfronted a 
serious ecenomic crisis. Critics have argued that the Nkrumah administration was waste-
49 
ful and eerrppt. It has been ''*nted Gut elsewhere that far more significant was 
the failure to institute effective plans t~ alter the inherited institutional structure 
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in order to build a balanced, integrated ecenomy directed to meeting the needs 
ef the Ghanaian population. As a result, Ghana's increased dependence en cecoa 
experts inevitably led to the ecenomic crisis when cecea prices fell from about 
725 cedis per don in 1954-5 to 338 cedies a ton in 1964-5. They dropped 22 percent 
in 1965, alone, drastically reducing tW• foreign exchange earnings and gevernment 
revenues. To c~ver its mounting social expenditures, the government berrowed 
heavily eversea.s. As the difficulty in paying off its debts increased, the @overn-
ment sought IMF assistance. The price fer that assistance, the Nkrumah Government 
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was infermed, was the implementatien of several measures. These included: a cut 
in the price paid to cGcoa farmers; manifestati•n of a 'liberal attitude toward 
fereign investment'; sharp reductions in government spending and a halt to the 
launching 0f new industrial projects; and an end to bilateral and barter arrangements 
* wtth secialist countries. 
; The Ghana Government immediately cut the cecea price paid to the farmers. It 
a 
announced it was making efferts te comply with other IMF requests, but that seme 
were contradictory t0 its efforts tQ restructure its political ec0nonty~l Within 
weeks of the Government's announcement, the Nkrumah Gevernment was ~verthrwwn. 
There is little doubt that the reductienof the pricepaid to the coc·oa farmers 
was a facter contributing te public support for the coup in the cocoa belt. 
The post c~~P Gevernment, which included civil servants whe had previously ne-
~otiated with tne IMF, set about implementing the IMF propesals in full. It devalued 
** Ghana's currency, which increased the c9st of the foreign debt in cedit terms, and 
c0ntributed to further domestic inflation. The :la&rhlxa~IUDllUltanew military ~overn-
ment ended all trade a~reements with the secialist countries, sold off state enter-
prises te foreign firms at exceptionally lew prices, and slashed g~vernment expendi-
tures by laying eff hundreds of workers. Unemployment mounted. Demestic prices soared. 
*The Seviet Unien had agreed to purchase about a third ~f Ghana's cecoa crop 
at a price almost double that prevailing in the world market, in exchan~e for 
capital goods and equipment required by Ghana t0 implement its indastrial ex-
pansion pro~ram. ~bdc:s 
**The IMF insisted that even those debts which had been adiittedly contracted as a result 
of pribes paid b~ forei~n firms must nevertheless be paid off. 
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The rest of the st0ry is well-knowns The military government was replaced by 
a eivilian administration which in its turn was overthr~wn. Ghana's increasingly 
exterally dependent economy steadily deteriorated. The new military g0veZ'l'lment, 
initially anneuncing efforts to achieve effective economie reo ... truetion, was quickly 
persuaded to pursue the IMF-charted path. The 'debt trapf/ Md amped its jaws on 
the first newly independent African victim. 
What IMF 'advice' was given to the Tanzanian Gevernment a decade later has not 
been published. The Gevernment has, however, taken stepst.B reduce state employment 
and devalue its currency. D•mestic inflatien remains a serious preblem. The Govern-
ileat baa net Mlcl .tf at.ate aba:rea of ewaerah1p •f 1a4utr1•• er ether cr1 tical secters oi 
shares of ownership of industries or other critical sectors of 
the economy. Whether it will be able to continue to pursue 
its socialist perspectives will depend in part, however, on 
whether it can return to its self-reliant policies or obtain 
assistance from OPEC or socialist countries. 
TanaaJJj~ 11'>!tr.tld appear to be tn a better positi~n than was Ghana to return to 
·-·-
its self-reliant posture. Whereas Ghana, under Nkrumah, never attained effective 
• centrel flf the 'e.-nclimg height•'• Ta.mania baa made aipifioant atepa in this 
.I"' ' direction! Its nationalized banks could provide a means of implementing an effective 
financial plan to direct all available domestic surpluses to app11oprlately planned 
imdustrial projects in the context of a long range strategy designed to build a balanced 
industrial structtlre integrated with agricultural ~~wth. This ~ught to be facilitated 
by the fact that the Tanzanian Government has made more serious attempts to implement 
a meaningful incomes poliey. Tanzania's ~reater control ef expcrt-impBrt and internal 
*The banks remained entirely in forei~n hands1 the state-owned commercial banks was 
never very signficant. The Ghana National Trading Cerporation, nan~ed by a fermer 
(ret•red) manager of the United Africa Company, handled only part of the trade. Basie 
industries remained predominantly in the private sector, escept fer the new ones which 
only began to be established in the last years Gf the Cilbla:K& Nkrumah administration. 
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wholesale trade should help it to develop the domestic market for consumer goods 
and simple producer goBds turned out by its grewing industrial sector. 
* In the last analysis, however, in Tanzania -- as in Ghana -- Tanzania's 
ability to pursue its efforts to achieve a socialist transfGrm&tion depends 
fundamentally on the ability of the party and government te mebllize and unite 
the working people and t • ~ntrJ te oa~ th~ the ..... tlal laatit• titinal 
cha~• req_ui nd. te plan and carry thr~ .a long-term. 1nd:ustrtal strategy 
to build a socialist state. 
Tanzania's experience underlines the difficulties faci ng 
any country with small investable surpluses which seeks through 
increased socialization of the means of production to achieve 
self-reliant, integrated, balanced development designed to 
expand productive employm_ent and raise the living standards of 
its population. 'rhe education and involvemen t of the masses of 
the people in the complex process of restructuring critical 
national and local i nstitutions is an imposing task. Dis-
engaging t hose inst i tutions from domination by transnational 
corporate interests to facilitate increased socialization of 
productive resources is by no means simple. In the midst of 
these diffi culties, it is essential simultaneously to focus 
careful attention on the details of physical and financial plans 
allocating those resources in directions more likely to lead to 
self-reliant, nationally integ rated development. 
*As former President Nkrumah wrote in his analytical. .retrospective analyses to be 
found in Dark Days in Ghana and Class Stru~gle in Africa. 
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B. Algeria: 
Algeria's national liberation movement won independence 
from France after years of guerrilla warfare. Many of the 
French settlers left after the cessation of hostilities, simply 
deserting estates and small sc~e manufacturine; establishments.9 
Various types of workers' management schemes were established, 
some of which were unsuccessful. But it is difficult to take 
over and manage a national economy, especially when more than 
a century of colonialism has denied the majority of the working 
people the rudimentaries of required education and skills. 
The Algerian Government initiated institutional changes 
to exert control over the commanding heights. The major banks 
have been nationalized. Export-import and internal wholesale 
trade is firmly in the hands of the state. The control of 
basic industries, oil, iron and steel, petro-chemicals, is in 
the state sector, some small scale consumer goods industries 
remain in p rivate hands. 
By the early 1SE3Venties, 1Ugeria had formulated a long-term 
industrial strategy focusing on the massive construction of 
basic industries in an effort to transform the entire national 
political economy into hi e;h levels of productivity in every 
sector.S:.t Whereas for countries like Tanzania rising oil 
prices contributed to serious balance of payments problem~ for 
Algeria, one of the leading OPEC nations, they have provided 
most of the necessary investable surpluses to invest in this 
planned transformation of its economy. The rest is being 
borrowed from the socialist and capitalist countries, wt l'Jigh 
oil prices have facilitated repayment of the debts on time.Si"' 
About 40 percent of Algeria's national product is invested 
annually, a major share of it in basic manufacturing industries. 
A smaller amount is directed to stimulate the lagging agri-
cultural sector. The new industries are relatively capital-
investive, but serious efforts are being made to integrate 
them into the rest of the national economy to foster increased 
productivity in other sectors. The planners apparently anti-
cipate that, by the time Algeria's limited oil reserves give 
out, and/or the world's energy users have developed lower-priced 
energy sources, it will have created a re·lati vely self-reliant 
industrialized economy, capable of breaking its former dependence 
on the western capitalist nations. 
Algeria confronts problems in its agricultural sector which, 
while differing from those of Tanzania, are serious. It inherited 
a profoundly dualistic a~ricultural economy. Major export 
crops were formerly produced by large settler-owned estates, 
while the majority of Algerian peasants scraped a bare sub-
sistence living out of fragmented, infertile plots in the 
hinterland. The estates have been turned into state farms, with ~ dtJr-t.e 
0~ worker participation in management. 
The government has sought to organize the peasants in the 
less developed regions into producer cooperatives, providi!18 
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them with necessary inputs and marketing facilities.S'6' 
has been a prolonged endeavor. Many of the peasants have 
drifted out of the rural areas into the cities, adding to 
problems of urban unemployment. A major drawback of the capital-
intensive industrial sector being created is that it is as yet 
incapable of absorbing labor clisplaced in the ~gricul tural 
sectors. Over time, it is anticipated that increasing produc-
tivity in the rural sectors will contribute to higher levels 
of life and reduce the urban drift. Achievement of socializ.ed 
development in the agr~?u,l tural sectors, even in countries 
with significant investable surpluses, however, clearly takes 
time. 
c. The Former Portuguese Colonies: 
Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau all attained political 
independence in 1975, after years of coordinated guerrilla 
warfare which contributed to the downfall of the Portuguese 
dictatorship. Unlike the :f'ira~ef .Afr1.c&11 •tat•• .-kin~ te build 
the tranet-tt!m to socialism, the political leadership of the former Portuguese 
colonies immediately focused attention on critical institutional changes to mo-
bilize the masses of the peasantry and workers while asserting direct control 
over the critical commanding heights of the na.tional economy. All have 
dedo.red their aim 0:f' carrying through the Marxist-Leninist road to socialism./ 
Mozambique has explicitly re-organized Frelimo as a vanguard party with the stated 
aim of giving leadership to the working people, peasantry, and committed petty 
bourgeois elements.5~Angola, ia.cing tme complex task of rebuilding its economy 
after the destruction caused by a tw0-prmnged invasion after independence, and 
tiat~xiimxa:rwlix%ka~ threatened by dangers of renewed invasions from north 
S'g 
and south, took a little longer to announce that step. Meanwhile, the national party, 
MPLA, bantinued to organize the population into ten-cell groups to mobilize 
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and educ.ate them for participation in the transition process. ") 
Both Angola and Mozambique have inherited state owner-
ship of the banks which had been taken over by the Portuguese 
after the overthrow of the dictatorship. Both exercise state 
control over export-import and internal wholesale trade. They 
have not attempted to take over management 9f the basic 
. \.b.lull"gt'~-~~ industries like the Cabom Bassa iil!J!li in Mozambique or the 
Cabinda oil wells, owned by Gulf Oil in Angola. ..... They pave, 
however, begun to negotiate the terms of new contracts to more 
clearly define their own long term interests and presumably 
their ultimate control, while ensuring continuation of the 
current inflow of government revenues. As their government 
spokespersons have ernphasizerf:V1aying the groundwork to gain 
control of the 'commanding heights' has to be approached much 
like preparing to capture an enemy stronghold in a military 
campaign. It is necessary to prepare the groundwork and 
ensure that the necessary cadres and backup material are in 
place before the final push. 
Both in Angola arnI Mozambique, the immediate effort of the 
governments is to mobilize to restore and increase agri-
cultural productivity in order to ensure at least that the 
populations have enough to eat without spending precious 
foreign exchange to import foodstuffs. Over t ime, it is 
expected that agriculture will be able to produce many of 
the necessary raw materials for a growing industrial sector. 
' ,.. 
I .t M fJ\Jt Vl.!J 
hozambique pi! on •• !Wt s ra1)idly towards collectivization of 
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agricultural production, buildinc on cooperation which began 
during the years of producing foodstuffs for the guerrilla 
army.'9 -
Many large seal utatee, ~bandoned by Portuguese settlers, have been 
turned int'o state farms with worker participation in management. Peasants in 
the subsisence sector are being mobilized into communal fiallages centered 
v 
around collective productive activities and provision of increased collectively-
'' 
provided services to raiae th•ir 11 nq etanaard.a. 
ln Angola, the government has concluded that the 
peasants, having just received the ri r:sht to use their own 
labor on their own land since the downfall of Portuguese 
rule, prefer at least at present to increase productivity on 
their own land.'-~ The Government's main contribution will be 
to provide necessary inputs credit and market s throu~h an 
expanding network of cooperatives. 
Neither Angola nor Mozambique has had time to formulate 
long-term industrial strategies. At most, they have used 
+G) 
their few skilled workers hrepair 
existing manufacturing machinery 
Portuguese. Meanwhile, they are beginning to 
available resources and industrial potential, as well as 
necessary industrial and agricultural linkages. Mozambique 
ministers have already met with Tanzanian planners'; to 
discuss future possibilities of coordinating and linking 
industrial developments between the two countries to take 
advantage of potential economies of scale, especially for 
0 ~ i~ wdl basic industries, ....r'Perhaps ay t _he groundwork for a 
regional hydro-electric power grid built around Cabont.Bassa 
and Tanzania's existing electrical capacity, as well as the 
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vast potantial which may ultimately be harnessed by developing Stigler's Gorge. 
:bvc'fzxz&11tax Obviously, however, the gathering of essential information and 
the implementation of key institutional changes to formulate and carry out an effective 
regional industrial strategy will take time. 
It is eviden+; e •••t••e that the transnational corporations do not welcome 
these efforts to achieve a thorough-going social transformation in the new nations 
in southern Africa. It is difficult to identify the specifically transnational 
eoI']!>orate initiatives directed at underming the new Mozambique and Angolan govern-
\.\ <IW( IJ'f.'(" 
ments; these are f~r self-etident reasons covert. Many efforts hav~Lbeen made to 
destabilize them. Portuguese employees, on leaving, tried either to take with 
them or destroy essential machinery and equipment required f0r transport or to 
run existing industries and ~:nixs agricultural estates. Shipments of machinery, 
equimpment and spare parts for factories previously owned by transnational interests 
are reported to have arrived da111&ged or containing less goods than had been paid 
for. Counterfeit money has been intrtMiuowi to und.erlline the nat1•11&l .eae7 &nd 
banking •1•t .. a. / Iti• 1.,.aa1bl• t• deterllin• t• wb&t •xt•t Ul ... act1Tit1ea 
• 
•Y haY• 'Men :toatend er fimnced. br t:ranaat1eml corpe:rat1••· 'ITen .. re 
destructive have been the ille~l Rhodesian gevernment's invasions of Mozambique, 
and the South African military supp•rt fer UNITA'e attempts t• undermine the An~elin 
Gevernment. 
It 1• •••11t1&1 te reali H tbat 
ha.ve lon~ perceived tJf e1!mthe-rn Africaas an integrated region, the door to the ex-
ploitation of which lay through the industrial (and hence military) build-up of 
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the South African ~egime. In attempting to assess the role of tra.nsnational cor-
.... 
orations vis a vis Mozambique and Angola, therefore, it is necessary ta review 
their overall role in southern an~harticularly South Africa. Transnational eor-
7 the 
porstions based in South Africa. ha.ve long violate-d/United Nations' boycctt of the 
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illegal regime of Seuthern Rhodesia {Zamb•bwe). Their rapidly expanding investments 
in South Africa's manufacturing industry have built up that country's military-
*What are, by now, well-kn0wn facts relating to transnational corporate activities, 
as well as undercover CIA agents', in zt::bnlx~Xllllt:xXkwxxz••tsXbl~x creating the 
conditions leading to the coup in Chile were, at the time, unknown to the public. 
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industrial base se that it is the most powerful (in modern technological terms) 
* en the continent. Transnational corporate banks have loaned almost as much 
funds to help the racist South African government everceme its political economic 
crisis (in part stemming from the independence of Mozambique and Angola") as 
' lfl they have leaned to all the rest of the independent African countries combined. / 
In other words, they have continued to build up Seuth Africa as the military-industrial 
base for their «>peratiens througheut the region. It is precisely the CQntinuatien 
of these investments and loans which the U.S. Government, along with those of Brita.in 
and France, ensured by their triple veto of the UN Security Council resolutiens 
to &alt further investment, leans or trade with South Afriea. 6~ 
Furthermore, the home-governments of the transnational corporations, led by 
the Carter Administra.tien, are making every effort to ensure that Zimbabwe and 
Namibia install 'moderate' governments to forestall the kind of fundamental 
restructuring of their political economies being aarried through in Meaambique 
and Angola. President Carter himself has maintained that continued transnational 
cerporate investment in South Africa is essential to ensure c~operation ~f the 
racist regime to achieve this goal.6' 
Whether Mozambique and Angola can successfully break out ef the circle Gf 
dependency created over the years by transnational corporations based in South 
Africa remains to be seen. Steeled in a decade ef guerilla warfare, aware ef 
the pitfalls enc~untered by the socialist-oriented states t• the north, their 
political leadership is clearly committe•« to a valiant effort to lnd:Xrixax achieve 
a secialist transformation which will influence the shape of future develepment 
in southern Africa. Their success xittx~aa:t~ has already contributed.,--" ...._..--lly 
te the et~l•• .r the 11lten.t1en mneaent~ ef 1'aa1b1a ant Ziallaltwe. 'ftte1r c•-
tinu1~ auccea• 1• crucial te the fllftda.ent&l pc>11t1oal-eceneaic ..e-t:nietion 
*It is precisely this military build-up which has led Andrew Young, u.s. Ambassador 
to the United Nations, to argue that it is necessary to find a 1 neo-c6lonial 1 so-
lution in South A~rica The liberation movements, especially the African Natienal 
Con~ress of South Africa, backed by the 'front line' presidents, including those 
et t 11 'n I I 'I\ to>-(\ ~ 'i'k"-t' 
of Mozambique and An~ola, armed struggle by guerilla armies 
is the only way to achieve real political-ecenomic independence. 
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required to &mktex.xr~IUl&X realize the vast regional potential for development 
geared to providing productive empl~yment opportunities and h•gher 11v1~ standards 
!er the aa••• .r tM regi..._ p.,.i.at1ena. 
Summary and Conclusion: 
Africa's role in the world capitalist commercial system 
has changed substantially in the few short years since more 
than 40 African states have attained independence. On the 
other hand, the transnational c orporations have intensified 
their competitive efforts and devised new techniques to 
penetrate their externally dependent political economies. 
Many African states, demagogically declarinc as their aim the 
buildin~ of socialism, have in fact created a bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie, an emergent class which has used state power to 
advance the power andprivilege of its limited numbers. While 
some of these have indeed experienced a kind of growth, their 
policies have opened ' the door to the increased domination of 
the national political economies by the transnational corpor a-
tions. 
Only a/few states have sought to initiate an effective 
transition towards building self-reliant, integrated socialist 
economies. Their back~rounds and resource endowments are 
significantly different. 'ranzania, with one of the lowest per 
capita incomes on the continent, has taken sienificant steps 
to restructure the politic al ec 1.!nomic institutions inherited 
from the colonial past, with a view to building rural socialism. 
In recent years it has encountered serious pro bl ans a~gravated 
L 
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by drought which have necessitated heav-j overseas borrowing, 
bringing with it the danger of increased external dependency. 
Algeria, endowed with its valuable oil wealth, has introduced 
critical institutional 1b~tanges and embarked on construction 
of heavy industry in e~ectation of rapid transformation of 
I .s e(1~.!, 
the national economy. 1 Th~, political problem of integrating 
I 
the rural population apd cementing a mass base among the 
peasants and workers r r mains. 
Th• •tf•rt• .t Jlr-ab1~11• &M .A1119la t• 181 t1ate a 
transition to socialism have been too brief to 
evaluation. in the course 
of a decade sound 
foundation for implementing pro·12osed socialist-oriented 
V\\cUV f1. ) 
prograrnfh. Their planners ave learned, too, of the steps 
to take and the pitfalls to be avoided from the experiences 
of other African nations. 
take the necessary steps to build a united movement of urban workers and the 
peasantry to back the necessary measures to achieve their prop~sed socialist 
tra.ns:6firma.tion. 
Their coepera.tien with the neighbering states and •l•h the liberation 
movements still struggle t• free Namibia, Zimbabwe and ultimately SeuthAfrica 
is an important feature ef this on-going process. If the fully liberated 
countries ~f southern Africa can united te fol':llulate ~nd iapl t Jeint 
Jl&n• fer regienal ••velep-nt, va.t epJ•rtui tiff •xi•t fer building b&•ic 
industries to provide preductive employment and raise the livi~s standards of 
the peeples through a socialist transformatien6f the entire region. 
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